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Self-determination and national 
minorities: the difficulties of ‘making’ 
a referendum in Schleswig-Holstein 
and why to think twice in Kosovo 
The unofficial, non-binding referendum in Northern Kosovo and the ongoing debate in the 
international community about solutions for the Serbian minority bring the problem of self-
determination for national minorities back to the fore. The right to vote on national allegiance and 
sovereign borders has never been a simple matter in European inter-state relations, let alone in 
international law. Such a referendum is not respected unless it holds international backing, even if it is 
considered a domestic matter. And a referendum on sovereign international borders is usually the 
result of long and often drawn out geo-political processes, including tediously negotiated settlements 
after major bellicose conflicts. It is not something national minorities can unilaterally decide to 
undertake independently. This is at least one of the lessons that European history has taught us. Thus, 
the case of Northern Kosovo is not likely to be any different than past referenda on national allegiance 
and sovereign borders. Drawing on the experience of the 1920 referendum in the Danish-German 
border region, this Issue Brief will put the problem of self-determination for the Serbs in Northern 
Kosovo in an historical perspective as a basis for a contemporary analysis.     
 
Tove H. Malloy, September 2012 
ECMI Issue Brief #27 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The referendum in Northern Kosovo in February 
2012 was not explicitly about borders. But it was 
clearly about national allegiance, since it asked 
voters whether they accepted the authority of the 
institutions of the Republic of Kosovo.
1
 
Approximately 50.000 Serbs live in Northern 
Kosovo. The respondents answered almost 100 
per cent in the negative thus providing an image 
of national self-determination for the territory of 
Northern Kosovo.
2
 Unfortunately, the notion of 
national self-determination is not very 
transparent, nor is the ideal of the right of self-
determination. It is thus important to separate 
the two notions.  
 
The right of self-determination can only be 
exercised through a process of choice, i.e. 
making a conscious decision. When a settlement 
is reached without the possibility of the involved 
subjects to exercise a choice, there is no self-
determination act. The argument for how to 
settle self-determination conflicts on the basis of 
self-determination claims can thus be 
misleading.
3
 With regard to national self-
determination, the tension between national 
allegiance and territorial integrity is the main 
reason why this notion is unclear. Problems arise 
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if independence is the end goal, as this 
challenges the principle of territorial integrity 
laid out in international law. The coupling of the 
national and a territory is thus restricted to 
„nations‟ that can demonstrate certain power 
over not only territory and population but also 
exert external power which yields international 
respect.
4
 In other words, the ability to claim total 
sovereignty not only legally but also morally is 
required. The debate on defining national self-
determination in relation to secession has been 
going on for decades among scholars and 
practitioners.
5
 It is not the purpose here to 
interfere with this issue.  
 
However, self-determination as a democratic 
concept can also be a matter of individual choice 
over non-sovereignty issues, such as everyday 
choices and preferences for a good and free life.
6
 
While this type of self-determination may also 
be about national belonging, it is often based on 
issues of cultural and material well-being as well 
as civic and human rights issues. This type of 
„plebiscite self-determination‟ is not necessarily 
less controversial than the secession type, 
especially if it will result in redrawing a 
sovereign border. But if it is non-secessionist 
and non-irredentist and based on mutual consent 
among all players involved, it is likely to gain 
support. Non-secession, non-irredentist 
plebiscites aimed at internal self-determination 
are used to settle administrative boundaries 
inside sovereign states – the so-called micro-
referenda. This we have seen successfully in the 
establishment of the Jura Canton of Switzerland 
in 1979.
7
 In addition, it can be used to reunite 
national minorities with a non-irredentist mother 
state. This we have seen in the case of the 
Danish minority in the Danish-German border 
region in 1920. In both cases the plebiscites 
were based on moral consensus and the idea that 
it would provide the desired effect of democratic 
self-determination. And in both cases, it was a 
matter of explicit decision making at the 
individual level through a vote.  
 
Notwithstanding the ongoing on-off status 
dialogue on Kosovo and the provisions for 
Northern Kosovo in the Ahtisaari, but also 
assuming that the issue is going to be on the 
international agenda for a while, it might be 
instructive in the case of Kosovo to recall how 
the referendum was „made‟ that settled the issue 
of a small disputed piece of land linking 
Denmark and Germany in which both the 
Danish and German cultures had co-existed for 
centuries – the former Duchy of Schleswig. 
 
II. CONFLICT 
 
The notion of national self-determination on the 
basis of national allegiance became 
institutionalized in Europe after World War I 
when the President of the United States 
incorporated his view of it into the peace 
negotiations in Paris in 1919.
8
 The principle 
became implemented through the Treaty of 
Versailles with mixed results. It provided for 
national self-determination for smaller sovereign 
states but it did not provide for self-
determination on the basis of national allegiance 
for all Europeans. Many of the proposed new 
borders in Europe created new national 
minorities who felt they belonged to nations 
which were destined to secede land to 
neighbouring states. Most of these minorities 
were not provided a right of self-determination 
to determine via a referendum to which nation 
they wished to belong. Instead, they became 
protected under the Minority Treaties system 
under the League of Nations and confined to live 
without a final say about their own lives and 
land. A few borders were, however, settled via a 
referendum. One such was the border between 
Denmark and Germany which was contested for 
centuries and had been redrawn half a century 
before.
9
 The Austro-Prussian war against 
Denmark in 1864 resulted in a large portion of 
Danish territory, the Duchy of Schleswig, being 
transferred to Prussia in 1867.  
 
The conflict had emerged in the 1840s when a 
Danish language movement had sprung up in the 
southern part of the Duchy of Schleswig. While 
the northern part had remained mainly Danish 
speaking, the southern part – between the 
present day national border and the river Eider – 
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had developed into a German speaking region. 
Only the non-educated, lower income groups in 
society had continued to speak Danish. The 
clergy and many schools had become German 
language based. When the Danish language 
movement began to insist on more Danish in 
schools and during church services, tensions 
arose within the Duchy of Schleswig as well as 
between the Duchy of Schleswig and the Duchy 
of Holstein both of which had been united in a 
double duchy or a political union since 1386. As 
a result, a counter movement arose in the Duchy 
of Schleswig around 1844. It adopted its own 
flag and hymn, and asked for independence from 
the Danish King in 1848.  
 
However, the King refused, and armies were 
mobilized on both sides of the invisible language 
border near the river Eider. One battle in 1848 
was lost by the Danes; another in 1850 was won. 
Although the Danish King had made a promise 
to the Austro-Prussian side to keep the Duchy of 
Schleswig together with the Duchy of Holstein, 
he nevertheless broke his promise in 1863 when 
he declared the Duchy of Schleswig part of the 
Danish Kingdom and constitutional realm. 
Austria and Prussia invaded the Duchy of 
Schleswig in January of 1864, and after a few 
battles near Flensburg and in what is today 
southern Denmark, the King lost and had to cede 
the Duchy to the victors.     
  
It would be a few more years before the Duchy 
actually became a legal entity of Prussia. In the 
meantime, members of the new Danish minority 
did not waste time. In September 1864, just a 
few months after the last shots had rung out, a 
delegation travelled to Paris to seek audience 
with Napoleon III. They did not meet the 
Emperor but were received by the French 
Foreign Minister. They delivered a plea for a 
referendum in Schleswig based on national 
allegiance. While it is not known if it influenced 
the Emperor‟s thinking, he nevertheless 
expressed his support for the idea of self-
determination of peoples in 1865. This in turn 
led the Danes in the area set to become part of 
Prussia to begin collecting signatures for a 
referendum. Unfortunately, the new Prussian 
authorities did not let the Danes get far with the 
effort. The police found and destroyed most of 
the signatures.  
 
 
III. TOWARDS THE RECOGNITION 
OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-
DETERMINATION  
 
In 1866 Austria and Prussia went to war against 
each other in large part due to a disagreement 
over the territory and management of the 
duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Austria lost 
the war, and a peace agreement was reached 
with Napoleon III acting as mediator. The Peace 
of Prague signed 23 August 1866 therefore 
included in paragraph 5 the right of self-
determination based on national allegiance for 
the Danes in northern Schleswig. The right was 
moreover guaranteed not only by Austria and 
Prussia, the signees to the treaty, but was also 
subject to a third party guarantee which meant 
that it could not be annulled by Austria and 
Prussia alone; a third party would have to agree. 
This gave the referendum an international 
dimension and became significant a number of 
years later when Austria and Prussia decided to 
annul the paragraph. In the area of Northern 
Schleswig there was an expectation that the 
referendum would be granted soon. The Danish 
minority even sent a delegation to Berlin to 
thank the Prussian Emperor Wilhelm I. 
However, no referendum was granted and on 24 
January 1867 the area of Northern Schleswig 
together with the rest of Schleswig and Holstein 
became part of Prussia.   
 
A period of democratization followed, and 
democratic elections became the norm as 
opposed to the rather authoritarian rule which 
the Danish kings had exerted. This 
notwithstanding, the Danish minority became 
subject to Prussian Germanization, and a purge 
of Danes from the Church and state authorities 
took place. The Danish minority was allowed 
freedom of association except in cases of 
political aims. However, in 1878 Prussia and 
Austria decided to annul paragraph 5. When it 
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became known in the region, the Danish 
minority became radicalized and mobilized on a 
stronger nationalistic notion. The Danish 
language again became an issue although many 
among the minority had spoken German as a 
mother tongue for years. Support for Danish 
leaning politicians grew and at the elections to 
the German Reichstag in 1881, the region 
elected two Danish minority members. The 
success only lasted briefly, and by 1884 the 
Danish identity was weakening among voters in 
large part due to the success of Germanification. 
A generational shift in the leadership of the 
Danish minority further exacerbated this. The 
new leaders were not even Danish speakers.  
 
Internal debates about the continuation of the 
claim to the right of self-determination also split 
the minority. Some felt that it was counter-
productive to insist on the right of self-
determination in part because economic co-
operation with Prussia had proven advantageous 
as opposed to co-operation with the rump state 
of Denmark which had little to offer. Moreover, 
the social democratic movement grew due to the 
increased industrialization, and material needs 
took a primary position with many voters. Even 
though the Social Democrats in the region 
maintained the demand for self-determination in 
their programme, the social agenda had priority 
and thus national feelings for Denmark waned.  
 
In 1908, the German authorities issued a new 
law on associations which banned all meetings 
in Danish with the exception of voter meetings 
preparing for elections to the Reichstag. Some 
counties in the north – today‟s Denmark – were 
granted dispensation from the rule until 1928. 
Moreover, during the years leading up to World 
War I, the Danish minority experienced 
intensified Germanification. School children 
were singled out by teachers if they committed 
to speaking Danish at home. After the outbreak 
of war, leaders of the Danish minority were 
interned briefly for a couple of months. Many 
were drafted and many died on the front.  
 
 
IV. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 
 
As soon as the armistice ending hostilities had 
been signed, a delegation of the Danish minority 
went to the Danish government to ask for 
support for a referendum. The government was 
reluctant and took a wait-and-see position. On 
23 October 1918, the leader of the Danish 
minority put forth the claim in the German 
Reichstag. However, the German government 
referred to the annulment by the Austro-Prussian 
regime in 1878. Nevertheless, a few weeks later, 
on 14 November, the German Foreign Minister 
sent a letter to the minority to the effect that the 
referendum was to be put on the agenda for the 
Paris negotiations. Immediately after receiving 
the letter, the Danish minority met on 16-17 
November to draft the first implementation plan 
for the referendum. The meeting adopted a plan 
for the northern counties. This was due to the 
fact that the weakening Danish identity in the 
south of the Duchy could influence the outcome 
negatively. There was a fear that if the entire 
Duchy voted together the overall result would be 
negative because the southern counties had 
become more German over the years.  
 
The plan became not surprisingly a cause for 
concern among the Danes in the southern 
counties, as they were faced with becoming 
included in the German state for good. They thus 
began mobilization for their own referendum, a 
second referendum for the southern counties. 
They collected signatures under much stress and 
pressure from the German population, and they 
appealed not only to the right of self-
determination on the basis of national allegiance 
but also to the historical facts, that the only 
reason why the southern counties had become 
more German was that they had been subjected 
to assimilation policies over the years. However, 
the adopted plan for the northern counties alone 
was presented to the Danish government which 
passed it on to the negotiators in Paris on 28 
November. Subsequently, the Danish 
government was asked to posit its own position 
on the referendum which it did in a letter of 12 
December 1918. The statement insisted on a 
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majority vote for Denmark in Northern 
Schleswig. The plan not to include the southern 
counties resulted in a plea to the Danish 
government to come to the rescue of the Danish 
minority left behind in the southern counties. 
During the Paris negotiations, the Danish 
ambassador therefore submitted the request for 
the northern counties and asked the parties to 
consider that a second referendum be issued for 
the southern counties.  
 
However, there remained concern among the 
northern counties and in the Danish parliament 
that even if some or all of the southern counties 
were to cast positive votes, they could in the 
long run create a security problem for Denmark 
due to the not entirely clear split in identities 
between German and Danish allegiance. At the 
time a Schleswig-Holstein movement had also 
emerged in favour of not having a referendum, 
and on both sides it was openly known that 
whatever the result, assimilation would 
eventually have to take place to secure the 
peace. The fear of assimilation had supporters 
not only in the southern counties but also in 
Copenhagen.  
 
It is important to note that the history of 
Denmark as ruler of the Duchy of Schleswig 
goes back to an agreement made in 813 between 
Charlemagne the Great and the Danish King 
Hemming to the effect that the Danish King 
could rule to the Eider River. The ramparts built 
by the Danish King to establish the limits of his 
rule are still visible today and were to become a 
symbol of Danish national identity during the 
centuries to follow. The ramparts thus play the 
same role in the minds of many Danes perhaps 
in the same vein as the Gazimestan in Kosovo 
does for the Serbs or Jerusalem for the 
Palestinians. Moreover, the Kaiser Wilhelm II 
Canal linking the Baltic Sea with the North Sea 
and finished in 1895 – now known as the Nord-
Ostsee-Kanal in Germany and the Kieler Kanal 
in Denmark – was believed to become 
international territory with Treaty of Versailles 
and was thus perceived as a natural border 
between the two cultures of Denmark and 
Germany by promoters of the historical view of 
self-determination. These views were 
championed by a private person in Copenhagen, 
Ionas Collins who went to Paris on his own and 
promoted the ideas. Ironically, the French 
government listened to him, most likely because 
he spoke to their views about curtailing 
Germany‟s power over its neighbours. As a 
result, the draft Treaty of Versailles included a 
third referendum for the most southern flank of 
the Duchy of Schleswig near the Canal.  
 
The Danish government did not agree with the 
draft of the Treaty and the third area for a 
referendum. It immediately protested and the 
final text of the Treaty included the two zones 
which had been proposed by the Danish 
ambassador. Thus, the Treaty of Versailles 
signed on 28 June 1919 included a double 
referendum for the Duchy of Schleswig. The 
northern counties, which had remained 
predominantly Danish-speaking, were to vote 
first, and the result would be counted in all 
counties as one. The southern counties eligible 
for a referendum were to vote a month later. The 
results would be counted according to county 
thus leaving flexibility for rather small entities to 
enjoy self-determination. The entire process was 
to be implemented and monitored by an 
international commission. The Treaty of 
Versailles went into force in January 1920 and 
the two referenda were set for 10 February 1920 
in the north (zone 1) and 14 March in the south 
(zone 2). The referendum question asked eligible 
voters whether they wanted to belong to 
Germany or Denmark.  
 
 
V. THE REFERENDUM 
 
The months before the voting saw a very volatile 
situation in the southern counties, especially in 
the main city of Flensburg which was considered 
by many a jewel in the Danish crown and still 
housed many loyal to the Kingdom. 
Articulations were made to the effect that 
Denmark should accept the city into the realm of 
the Kingdom no matter what the result. The 
Danish government countered this rhetoric with 
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the clear statement that Flensburg would not 
become Danish unless a majority of the residents 
had cast their vote for it. Ironically, several of 
the cities and towns in the northern counties 
were not expected to yield a majority either but 
this was to become irrelevant because of the 
different voting system. The campaigns for and 
against the referendum thus became very heated 
in the southern counties and especially in 
Flensburg. While the campaign was not violent, 
there were skirmishes in a number of cases. 
Moreover, the major employers in the city 
announced just a few days before the voting that 
they would close and move south if the 
referendum was in favour of Denmark. The 
Social Democratic Party also advised workers 
that the new Weimar Republic would provide 
more freedoms and entitlements than Denmark. 
Clearly the lines were drawn in the sand. 
 
The results of the two referenda did not 
surprisingly follow the identity lines which had 
emerged over the last decades. The voting in the 
northern counties resulted as expected in a 
majority for unification with Denmark. 74,9% 
vote for and 25,1% voted against. Of the four 
major towns, however, only one – Haderslev – 
could muster a majority for Denmark. In the 
southern counties the overall vote was 20% for 
Denmark and 80% for Germany. In Flensburg 
25% voted for unification with Denmark. In the 
days prior to the voting in the southern counties, 
eligible voters from both the south and the north 
had been brought to the region. Many living 
outside the Duchy were eligible to vote due to 
prior ties to the region. They were either bussed 
or shipped into the region. This did not, 
however, make any difference to the result. The 
city of Flensburg and most of the southern 
countries were not able to provide a positive 
result.  
 
The negative result in the south caused great 
disappointment especially in Flensburg. A 
delegation of leaders of the Danish minority 
immediately went to Copenhagen to request the 
help of the government. They also felt that the 
mood of the Danish population had turned to 
their favour; Flensburg should be welcomed in 
the Kingdom in spite of the result of the 
referendum. However, the Prime Minister Carl 
Theodor Zahle and his government refused. 
They maintained the position stated in 1918. 
Individuals of the opposite view contacted the 
King and made him dismiss the government 
which was in his power. Nevertheless, the next 
government also maintained the line of the Zahle 
government. Instead, the delegation from 
Flensburg decided to seek international support 
and demand that it became a protectorate under 
the League of Nations. The new Danish 
government did not support this but also did not 
declare opposition to it, in the event the 
delegation had success. The Flensburg 
delegation therefore went to Paris to present its 
demand. It was not however successful and the 
dream of many that the crown jewel of the 
Danish Kingdom return to its „owner‟ never 
became fulfilled. The city became the most 
northern town in the new Weimar Republic.   
 
VI. OUTLOOK 
 
What does it take to „make‟ a referendum 
regarding the borders of a disputed area of land 
which is home to a group of people who fear 
that they may become assimilated against their 
will? If the two referenda in Schleswig are any 
indication, at least four observations can be 
made. 
 
First, the outcome of the conflict would have to 
be considered unfair by a major power player. In 
the case of Schleswig, Napoleon III made the 
issue a moral issue for Europe backed by his 
own political standing.
10
 At the time, there was 
no League of Nations or UN that could have 
mediated and secured the rights of the Danish 
minority. Napoleon III was the only other most 
powerful person aside from Prussia. Today, the 
Serbs in Northern Kosovo have some support 
from the UN through the UNSC Resolution 
1244, but they would have to get the UN to take 
further steps. Since the UN has already made its 
position clear through the Resolution  and the 
endorsement of the Ahtisaari Plan, the redrawing 
of the border is not currently open to them 
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because the Ahtisaari Plan envisions self-
government for Northern Kosovo. Alternatively, 
the EU might be seen as the moral force that 
supports the Serbian minority. Notwithstanding 
the fact that at this point it is not clear how 
Kosovo proper will be included in the EU and 
the fact that the EU supports UNSC Resolution 
1244, this is also not very likely given its history 
with other EU conflict areas, such as Northern 
Ireland, the Basque Country and Northern 
Cyprus. „Looking the other way‟, has been the 
EU strategy with regard to these conflicts, so it 
is not likely to make an exception in the case of 
Northern Kosovo.  
 
Secondly, it may take years during which the 
ball is thrown back-and-forth between players 
and institutions. The period from 1866, when the 
Peace of Prague recognized the right of self-
determination for the Danish minority in 
Schleswig, to 1919, when the Peace of Paris 
finally implemented the recognition, was in fact 
half a century. During this period the Danish 
minority continued to stand on its right and 
demanded the referendum. In contradistinction, 
the Serbs in Northern Kosovo declared 
unilaterally and with no international backing a 
referendum only four years after the declaration 
of independence by Kosovo and 12 years after 
the end of the conflict. While the unofficial 
reference was most likely an articulation of 
discontent, much more quiet diplomacy and 
negotiation would clearly be in the cards for the 
Serbian minority if they wish to pursue the 
matter. Moreover, the overall status issue of 
Kosovo has more urgency to the international 
community. Since Serbia‟s membership of the 
EU is not a promise for resolve, but rather for a 
status quo, and it is not clear how Kosovo will 
enter the EU, the Serbian minority may expect to 
see the ping-pong game continue for quite some 
time to come unless a personality of leadership 
and high moral standing intervenes, if such 
exists. Most likely, the Serbian minority is 
„stuck‟ with the Ahtisaari Plan, which in the 
long run might provide more individual choice 
than if the minority opts to rejoin Serbia.  
 
Thirdly, a major bellicose geo-political conflict 
may help put the issue in new perspective. In 
Schleswig the event that eventually allowed the 
right of self-determination to re-emerge on the 
agenda was the peace negotiations after World 
War I. After major upheavals, which have upset 
the establishment of states and the general power 
structure as well as the received notion of peace, 
political space often emerges for new issues or 
issues that have been rejected in earlier 
paradigms.
11
 This happened of course in the 
Balkans in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Unlike the Peace of Paris which was negotiated 
over some months, the settlement of the Balkan 
conflicts is still ongoing. Of course, the Serb 
referendum could be seen in this perspective. 
Unfortunately, the EU‟s regional approach, 
implemented through the Stability and 
Accession Process, is not very clear on conflict 
management, and conditionality on minority 
protection has been applied bilaterally as in 
previous enlargements. However, it may require 
disregarding the bilateral approach (EU-Serbia 
and EU-Kosovo) and looking to the multilateral 
level. Here the EU might have some leverage 
with respect to the ongoing enlargement efforts. 
In contradistinction to the bilateral approach, the 
„regional approach‟ to preparing the Western 
Balkans for membership may hold potential for 
the Serbs in Northern Kosovo. A „regional 
conditionality‟ which includes a solution for 
Northern Kosovo might be needed.  
 
Fourthly, even if an internationally backed 
referendum were to be held, it might not provide 
full justice to all involved. The case of the 
second referendum in Schleswig showed that a 
referendum may not bring happiness to all 
members of a minority. The members of the 
Danish minority living in the southern counties 
of Schleswig were not only losers; they were 
also left without any right to self-government or 
autonomy within the Weimar Republic. Like in 
Schleswig, a referendum for Northern Kosovo 
might leave more than half of the Serbian 
minority in Kosovo without any right of self-
determination. This is because the Serbs living 
in the so-called enclaves, municipalities within 
the rest of Kosovo, would also have to be taken 
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into consideration. They number around 60 per 
cent of the Serbs living in Kosovo. No doubt 
they would claim a right of self-determination, 
too. In addition, there are Serbs living among 
Albanians in districts which are predominantly 
Albanian. If the timeframe of Schleswig is any 
indication, the enclaves in Kosovo may have 
changed demographically by the time a 
referendum is held. This means uncertainty 
about the outcome, and could spell new trouble 
for Kosovo.  
 
„Troubles‟ is in fact the term occasionally used 
now to refer to the seemingly intractable issue of 
Northern Kosovo, thus drawing an analogy to 
the situation in Northern Ireland. While no case 
is similar, history does have an instructive effect. 
The situation in the Danish-German borderland 
was certainly a trouble to leaders and politicians 
for many years. And Northern Ireland, while by 
and large now peaceful, still experiences tension 
and skirmishes. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Minority politics in Europe definitely happens in 
slow motion. It took almost a century to achieve 
full settlement in the Danish-German border 
region in spite of a moral momentum created at 
the beginning with Napoleon III endorsing the 
right of self-determination for the Danish 
minority in 1866. As the Danish government had 
rightly observed in 1918, the Danish minority in 
the southern counties would continue to seek 
justice. Thus, the border issue re-emerged again 
after World War II. At that time, the Danish 
government would not risk any further tensions. 
It issued a statement few hours after the 
armistice that had ended the fighting in Northern 
Germany to the effect that it would not seek to 
open up the border issue again. To some this 
was the last nail in the coffin. However, the 
Danish minority nevertheless continued to 
nurture the national allegiance with Denmark 
and vice versa. They were in turn rewarded with 
another settlement result in 1955 when Denmark 
and Germany agreed to issue jointly but 
unilaterally declarations of intent to protect the 
national minorities residing in the border region, 
the so-called Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations.
12
 
Subsequently, the minorities on both sides of the 
border have achieved cultural autonomy in a 
number of areas, similar perhaps to the type of 
„autonomy‟ that the Serbian minority in the 
enclaves of Kosovo currently experience 
through Serbian funding. In Schleswig the 
cultural autonomy is functional in that it is not 
enshrined in law as a minority right, and it is 
currently funded 40 per cent by the government 
of Schleswig-Holstein and 60 per cent by the 
Danish government. According to international 
law custom, this funding scheme is actually not 
good practice. Under international law, states are 
obliged to ensure the full protection of national 
minorities residing in their territory. So even in 
Schleswig-Holstein there is room for 
improvement almost one hundred years later.  
 
This shows that a referendum alone is not a 
panacea for a national minority. It leaves most 
likely loose ends to be tied as well as some 
tidying up to do. In fact, it took another 35 years 
for the southern counties of Schleswig to get 
justice. Thus, the right of self-determination for 
the Danish minority was established in 1866; it 
was implemented in 1920, and for those not 
lucky in 1920, some satisfaction was achieved 
only in 1955. This is because while the 1866 
paragraph 5 of the Peace of Prague established 
the legal right to self-determination for the 
Danish minority, it did not establish 
international moral consensus. This was only 
established later at the peace negotiations after 
World War I. Moreover, the loose ends were 
also tied through international negotiations even 
though the 1955 Declarations were issued on the 
basis of bilateral discussions. These discussions 
were part of the wish of Germany to become a 
member of NATO to which it sought the 
supportive vote of Denmark in the NATO 
Council. Denmark‟s condition was a protection 
scheme for the part of the national minority in 
Schleswig which had not achieved self-
determination. In Kosovo, the Serbian minority 
in the enclaves have begun to accept the 
authority of Kosovo institutions. This is most 
probably out of necessity and will lead to some 
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degree of assimilation if not administered 
correctly.  
 
Aside from the four historical perspectives on 
process derived from the Schleswig issue, there 
is the perspective of state behaviour. In the case 
of Schleswig, the mother state showed restraint 
in terms of definition of the scope of the right of 
self-determination when the Danish government 
refrained from any irredentist articulations and 
even requested a more limited scope of the 
referendum than first offered by the Allied 
Powers in the first draft of the Treaty of 
Versailles. In the case of Northern Kosovo it 
would thus have to be established first and 
foremost whether it is a wish of the Serbian 
minority and not a wish of the mother state 
Serbia to have the northern territory returned to 
Serbia. Although Serbia is funding the 
institutions in Northern Kosovo, it is not entirely 
clear why this is happening. Is it driven by 
irredentism or humanitarian concerns? Thus, it 
would have to be established that it is a case of 
the well-being of the Serbian minority. This may 
be made on the basis of past oppression and the 
risk of future oppression, including the ability of 
the current territorial ruler to secure the well-
being of the population in the disputed area. 
Given that the Ahtisaari Plan provides for 
arguably more self-government than the Serbian 
minority would achieve if Northern Kosovo was 
returned to Serbia, greater well-being might be 
guaranteed by refraining from the right of self-
determination and a referendum and remaining 
within Kosovo sovereignty 
 
This story may seem anachronistic so many 
years later, and perhaps it is if one contemplates 
the variables that are now available for minority 
politics in Europe. Two major variables exist for 
Northern Kosovo which did not exist in 1920. 
First, the European minority rights regime 
provides some outlook for claiming certain 
rights. Notwithstanding Kosovo‟s disputed 
status, Kosovo is bound by direct applicability 
of international agreements and instruments 
through Article 22 of its 2008 Constitution. 
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its Protocols, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 
Protocols, The Council of Europe Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination are applicable in Kosovo. 
Secondly, Chapter III of the Kosovo 
Constitution provides for a detailed and 
extensive minority rights regime in Kosovo and 
is considered a good practice example of 
minority protection and minority rights in 
Europe. The Danish minority in Schleswig did 
not have such an elaborate regime on which to 
rely in 1866. 
 
No one is arguing that implementation of the 
Ahtisaari Plan will be the panacea for the 
Serbian minority in Kosovo. Experience in other 
minority regions in Europe can attest to the fact 
that it takes years to implement even good plans. 
Like the Danish minority in Schleswig, the 
German-speaking minority in Northern Italy had 
to wait 46 years before the settlement between 
Italy and Austria was fully implemented. The 
right to autonomy which was established in 1946 
in the Gruber-De Gaspari Agreement only saw 
full implementation in 1992. However, both 
cases are today considered good practice 
scenarios precisely because they have provided 
the minorities with some options for individual 
choices, i.e. the power to decide on issues 
considered vital to individual identity and 
development. Politics which a century ago was 
seen as leading to assimilation need not do so 
anymore. Good state behaviour in terms of 
political will and reciprocity are the key to this. 
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1 Civil-Military Fusion Centre, "Governance", Kosovo. A Bi-Monthly News Review, February 2012, Available 
at:https://cimicweb.org/medbasin/Holder/Documents/k002CFCKosovoBiMonthlyReview(29-Feb-2).pdf (accessed 3 
September 2012). 
2 Ibid. 
3 For examples of conflict settlements based on self-determination claims, see Marc Weller, “Settling Self-
determination Conflicts: Recent Developments” in the European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 
111-165.  
4 The four criteria of the 1933 Montevideo Convention by which states recognize each other in international law 
provide that „The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent 
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.‟ Quoted 
in Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 70. 
5 For an overview see, Margalit, Avishai and Raz, Joseph, “National Self-Determination” in Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 87 (1990), No. 9, pp. 439-461.  
6 Sovereignty is of course a concept derived from the philosophical notion of sovereignty of the individual through 
individual autonomy and personal self-determination. This is now understood as the right of self-determination of 
peoples as enshrined in the UN Charter, Article 1 and in General Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970).  
7 An example of a non-successful micro-referendum was the vote in certain counties of the Province of Veneto in 
Italy where the Ladin speaking minority live. The aim was to transfer the counties to the neighbouring Province of 
Bolzano where language rights for the Ladin minority are protected.   
8 See: The Avalon Project, Yale Law School Library, "President Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Points", Available at: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (accessed 3 September 2012). 
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9 The recap of the year-old conflict in the Danish-German border region is based on the chapter by Rene Rasmussen, 
“Subjects of Prussia – 1864-1945” in Lars N. Henningsen (ed.), Sydslesvigs danske historie (Flensburg: 
Studieafdelingen, Dansk Centralbibliotek for Sydslesvig, 2009) 
10 Of course, Napoleon III was not entirely without interest in the case. Bismarck had promised him Veneto, if he 
stayed out of the war between Austria and Prussia. 
11 Jackson Preece, Jennifer, National Minorities and the European Nations-States System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998) 
12 The so-called Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations were the result of negotiations between Denmark and Germany 
about Germany‟s pending membership of NATO. In return for its vote for Germany, Denmark received assurances 
about the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein.  
